Julian Jaynes Society Wiki

The implications of Jaynes’s ideas are far-ranging. Besides ancient history and the origins of religion, his theories help us understand neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, neuroplasticity, anomalous psychological behavior (e.g., hypnosis and spirit possession), linguistics, metaphor, philosophy (the mind‒body dualism problem), art and aesthetics, the dynamics of modern politics, counseling, psychotherapy, the interface of psychology with technology, and the future of the ever-changing human psyche.

Vestiges of Bicameral Mentality

Mainstream psychology lacks a coherent theory that accounts for spirit possession, speaking in tongues, channeling, hypnosis, imaginary childhood playmates, and schizophrenic hallucinations. Jaynes's theory of bicamerality offers a framework that explains these atypical sociopsychological behaviors.

Spirit possession is practiced in most societies around the world. However, it is not clear if it was practiced in preconscious times. In other words in the bicameral age no supernatural entity speaks “through” a person. Given that possession is global and ubiquitous since the first millennium BCE, it is a good question why this is the case.

Those controlled and forced to mouth the messages of Yahweh—the Old Testament prophets—are famous examples of possession behavior. The prophets, central to the Old Testament, were chosen by Yahweh. Only they could commune directly with the divine and experience what we call audiovisual hallucinations. Their behavior―shouting and bellowing the admonishments and rebukes of Yahweh―indicate a transition. By around 400 BCE they had lost their prominent place in society.

Possession is not a return to bicameral mentality, though these behaviors are most likely related. Spirit possession appears to be a derivative of bicamerality and its contours follow the General Bicameral Paradigm. The collective cognitive imperatives, expectancies, and the rituals of induction resulted in possession behavior for which the right hemisphere―the god-side―was responsible.

Jaynes believed that the hallucinations of bicamerality and the speech of prophets and the possessed are related for the following reasons: (1) they serve the same social function; (2) They yield similar communications of authorization; and (3) the early history of oracles strongly suggests that possession is a gradual outgrowth from the hallucinations of gods.

Jaynes conceded that possession behavior calls into question his neurological model of bicamerality. However, possession does not completely jeopardize his arguments. In modern times those “possessed” by spirits are probably not engaging right hemispheric speech centers for the articulated speech. More likely, while hallucinations were organized and heard from the right hemisphere in the bicameral mind, in modern possession, articulated speech is a left hemisphere production but controlled by the right hemisphere. So what corresponds to Wernicke's area on the right hemisphere is using the left hemisphere’s Broca's area. Such cross control causes trancing and depersonalization.

It is clear that normal hemispheric dominance relations are disturbed, so that the right hemisphere is more active than it is normally. Perhaps the early training of the oracle and induction procedures resulted in a higher ratio of right hemispheric activity in relation to the left. Perhaps this accounts for the contorted features and the rapid, involuntary, oscillatory motion of the eyeball (nystagmic eyes), i.e., right hemisphere interference or release from inhibition by the left hemisphere.

Jaynes refers to hypnosis as the “black sheep of the family of psychological problems” (Jaynes, 1976, p. 379). Hypnosis is similar to other anomalous sociopsychological behavior in that thought it is well-described and researched, we don’t really understand it. Heightened imagination, increased suggestibility, the ability to enact different roles—like “trance” and “dissociation,” these are just descriptions, not really explanations.

Jaynes asks a simple but disturbing question: If, as many of us assume, conscious mentality is an evolved, genetically determined ability, why can it be rather easily altered by hypnosis? He rejected the genetic explanation and viewed consciousness as a cultural capability acquired recently, and resting upon a vestigial substrate of an earlier more authoritarian type of social control. Jaynes utilized what he called the General Bicameral Paradigm to explain hypnosis.

(1) Collective Cognitive Imperative. The historical changes in understandings of what we call hypnosis illustrate the role of culture and the preconceptions and assumptions of a particular period. As beliefs about hypnosis changed, so did its very nature. For example, the metaphor of Newtonian gravitational forces, tides of attraction between all bodies, living and inorganic, would inspire the thinking of the German physician Franz Anton Mesmer (1734‒1815). In the early 1800s people began to forget what had happened during the trance episode. This was a new phenomenon. Some began to diagnoses their own illnesses.

The Scottish physician Sir James Braid (1795‒1860) believed that hypnotic suggestion was a valuable remedy in functional nervous disorders. He gave the trance state its commonly used appellation of “hypnosis,” from Hypnos, the Greek god of sleep. The brilliant neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–1893) regarded the ability to be hypnotized as a clinical feature of hysteria. For the Salpêtrière School, susceptibility to hypnotism was synonymous with illness. Charcot, who became famous for his clinical exhibitions that brought together gendered assumptions and other beliefs of the period, saw three successive phases of hypnotism: Catalepsy, lethargy, and somnambulism. Though he eventually discarded hypnosis, Freud was influenced by both Charcot’s and Bernheim’s ideas on hypnosis, coming to believe that consciousness was just the tip of the iceberg of the totality of the psyche.

(2) Induction. In hypnotism a variety of techniques can be used to narrow consciousness that rely on directed attention to sensory stimuli, while the use of spatial metaphors of “going under,” “submersion,” and going “deeper” can be powerful inductive methods. But if the subject continues to narratize with their analog “I” or “see” their metaphor “me” being hypnotized, inducing the hypnotic trance will be unsuccessful.

(3) Trance and Paralogic Compliance. Once hypnotized, narratization is restricted and the “I” is effaced and a sense of spatialized imaginary time evaporates. The deeper the trance, the more radical control of automatic responses becomes, and the more suggestible, the easier it is to alter a subject’s identity (though just temporarily).

Here Jaynes introduces a key concept in hypnosis studies, “trance logic.” But he prefers “paralogic compliance to verbally mediated reality.” Paralogical means that, while entranced, the rules of logic are shoved aside allowing the hypnotized to comply with verbal assertions and commands coming from the hypnotist about reality that are not true. Paralogic is found everywhere, e.g., from self-deception, cognitive distortions, idealized political ideologies, fervent religiosity, irrational beliefs, to out-and-out superstitions. We need to keep in mind that rules of logic are external standards of truth, not how mental processes actually operate. Paralogic explains why a subject will walk around a chair but then claim that no chair was in their way.

(4) The Hypnotist as a Source of Authorization. Hypnotism is a special type of “archaic authorization.” This shapes the quality of the hypnotic experience, i.e., instead of authorization originating from a possessing god, it is the operator—the hypnotist—that becomes the authority figure. But if trust is lacking or the prevailing stronger cognitive imperative is not convincing enough, the subject will not be so easily hypnotized and may require more elaborate induction procedures.

Hypotheses about Hypnosis

Jaynes’s theory predicts that in the EEG’s of a hypnotized subject, the ratio of brain activity in the right hemisphere would be increased over that of the left (though this is complicated by the fact that it is the left hemisphere that to some extent must understand the operator). When Jaynes proposed this hypothesis, the research results were conflicting. But he provided some indirect evidence. First, people who, when answering questions face to face, turn their eyes to the left and are therefore using their right hemisphere more than most others, are much more susceptible to hypnosis. Arguably this means that hypnosis engages the right hemisphere in a special way and that the more easily hypnotized person is the one who “listens to” the right hemisphere more than others.

Second, a linkage seems to exist between right hemispheric traits (being creative, spatial, and vivid imagery) and susceptibility to hypnosis.

Third, if hypnosis is a vestige of bicameral mentality, we should expect that those most susceptible to hypnosis would be those also most susceptible to other instances of the General Bicameral Paradigm. This seems to hold true for people who are involved in religion.

Fourth, evidence exists that those who have imaginary companions (occurring mostly between the ages of three and seven, right before according to Jaynes, when consciousness is fully developed), are easier to hypnotize later in life than the general population. Again hypnotizability is correlated with another relic of bicameral mentality

Finally, if we assume that punishment in childhood instills a strengthened relationship to authority figures, we might be able to conclude that such socializing experiences engage aspects of bicamerality. And research demonstrates that those who suffered severe punishment in childhood or were raised in highly disciplined homes are more easily hypnotized.

Jaynes asked, like many continue to do so, whether or not hypnosis is really anything different from what happens every day in the normal conscious state. In other words, is hypnosis really just an exaggeration of more typical phenomena?

What about the obedience toward the hypnotist? In our mundane lives we unthinkingly follow the instructions of a teacher, traffic police officer, or even a dance partner.

What about something like “suggested deafness”? A hypnotized subject only hears the voice of the hypnotist. But we’ve all had the experience of not listening as carefully as we should to another. A mother may sleep soundly through a raging thunderstorm but be startled by her infant’s cry.

What about induced amnesia? This favorite trick of stage hypnotists is not as impressive as it seems, since many of us often forget what we said just a few minutes ago.

What about paralysis under hypnosis? Many of us, when engaged in a particularly absorbing activity, will not notice how we eventually cease our movements. Think of being deep in conversation with a friend during a walk until, becoming increasingly focused on the topic, walk more and more slowly until you are standing still.

What about hypnotic anesthesia? This is another impressive hypnotic phenomenon. But think how easy it is to distract hurt children with a bright toy so that they soon forget their pain.

What about the “hidden observer” or dissociation, a common explanation for hypnosis? Parallel processing characterizes complex cognitive systems, and almost any activity requires what might be termed minimal dissociation. Think of driving a car or conversing with someone; we must engage multiple behaviors simultaneously.

What about post-hypnotic suggestion? We often decide to react to some event in a certain way and then follow through with our planned behavior. We may even forget our original reason for doing so.

Despite the commonalities and overlap with everyday behaviors, hypnotism still stands as a singular phenomenon. It has distinct characteristics that resonate profoundly with other vestiges of bicamerality. Moreover, there are significant differences in how special induction procedures make hypnotic trancing easier. Certain impressive behaviors are very difficult to carry out in a normal state of consciousness. “Such feats without rapport with an operator require grotesque efforts of persuasion and massive burdens of concentration” (Jaynes, 1976, pp. 399‒401).

Understanding Mental Illness and Hearing Voices

Voices hijack our volition, criticizing and berating us. Our boundaries of self dissolve. A normal sense of time disappears. Our personal mental space fades away. We lose track of our actions. We feel manipulated by insidious, overpowering forces. Jaynes contended that this mental disease is an unwelcome return to an earlier mentality, a relapse into bicamerality.

In ancient Greece a clear linkage was made between what today we call schizophrenia and bicameral mentality or at least its vestiges. Indeed, when insanity is initially mentioned in the conscious period, it is referred to in bicameral terms. Like many other peoples, the ancient Greeks regarded insanity as a boon from the divine. One Greek expression for insanity, paranoia, literally meant having another mind alongside one’s own (para + nous). This describes both bicamerality as well as the hallucinatory voices of schizophrenia.

Jaynes saw an intimate connection between schizophrenia and bicamerality. The symptoms of the former resonate with bicameral mentality.

The first symptom is the most striking: Auditory hallucinations. These are almost always present in florid unmedicated schizophrenia. For many sufferers of schizophrenia, hallucinations seem to be a replacement of conscious thoughts.

Typically, auditory hallucinations are not under the control of the schizophrenic, who can be susceptible to the innocuous hints from the social environment. So just like hypnosis, the prevailing collective cognitive imperative configures schizophrenic symptoms.

The second symptom is a collection of conditions that relate to the deterioration of consciousness. Specifically, the erosion of the analog “I,” the collapse of mind‒space, and an inability to narratize.

For Jaynes, schizophrenic hallucinations are vestiges of an earlier mentality. He explained his reasoning:

• The brain possesses innate “aptic structures” for hallucinations. These structures are imbued with authorization and organized into hierarchies. Many hallucinations are infused with religious sentiment. But if hallucinations lack such religiosity they still nevertheless function as a type of authorization; this means the present-day schizophrenic hallucinations possess the same function as they did for preconscious people. But schizophrenia is only a partial relapse to bicameralism. A schizophrenic individual is still a conscious being and learned subjectivity can never be completely suppressed or erased. A bicameral individual, unlike a profoundly alienated and lost schizophrenic, was a member of a strictly stratified super-spiritualized community who lacked any trace of angst or estrangement. Hallucinations are released from their normal inhibition by the abnormal biochemistry associated with schizophrenia. Jaynes noted the following:

• The Advantages of Schizophrenia. One advantage of bicamerality is tirelessness, i.e., our analog “I” cannot ruminate or narratize excuses on why we need to take a break. By the same token our physiological selves cannot convince our analog “I” that we need to take a break since the latter does not exist in preconscious individuals. Another advantage is how bicameral individuals (and schizophrenics) are more sensitive to and alert to sensory impressions. They see every tree and never the forest. They cannot narratize down possible paths or conciliate unnecessary associations. This means they are less likely to meander and wander around their mental space, become distracted, and mull over the nuances of their choices.

No doubt certain genes were selected to undergird bicameral mentality. However, genes do not in any simplistic fashion “cause” any form of mentality and enculturation far outweighs the role of genetics in the emergence of consciousness.

• Unlike most people, slightly more activity is apparent in the right hemisphere of schizophrenics.

• After several minutes of sensory deprivation, increased right hemisphere activity in schizophrenia is much more evident. This is the same condition that triggers hallucinations in the nonclinical population.

• It seems as if schizophrenics “get stuck” on one hemisphere or the other; they cannot shift from one mode of information processing to another as fast as normals. This results in illogical speech and confused behavior compared to most other people, who switch back and forth at a faster rate.

• Slower switching in schizophrenia seems to have an anatomical basis. Autopsies of schizophrenics revealed that the corpus callosum which connects the two hemispheres is 1 millimeter thicker than in normal brains. This may mean more mutual inhibition of the hemispheres in schizophrenics.

• Certain dysfunctions of the left temporal cortex typically release the right temporal cortex from normal inhibitory control. In 90% of patients with a lesion on the left temporal lobe (or on both the left and right) that causes temporal lobe epilepsy, the right hemisphere is released from its normal inhibition and these patients develop paranoid schizophrenia with florid hallucinations.